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Abstract: 
In Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Professor Robert 
W. Hefner challenges a notion that downgrades the peripheral status of Islam 
in Indonesian studies1 by concerning himself with answering a question: Did 
Indonesian Muslims resist democracy?2 The author answers this from 
theoretical and empirical perspective.3  
 
Discussion 
Theoretically, he occupies himself with social anthropology to seek 
social groups’ behaviours, and historical sociology to uncover social 
proportions: moments and events.4 So Hefner looks supposedly not only the 
present time (reform period), but also all the way back to the pre-reform era: 
the Old Order presided by Soekarno (1945-1965), and the old one by President 
Soeharto (1965–1998). Empirically, Hefner conducted his field work in three 
phases: 1970s, 1985,5 and each summer during 1990s (till 1998).6 He lived in 
                                                 
1Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. ix. I am fully grateful to Usep 
Abdul Matin, S.Ag., M.A., M.A., Ph.D. for guiding me in reviewing this book.  
2Ibid., p. vii 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., pp. xix, 157.  
5Ibid., p. xiii 
6Ibid., p. xviii 
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Pauruan in East Java, where the most powerful membership prevailed,7 but he 
interviewed more than four hundred people elsewhere in Indonesia.8  
Civil Islam consists of eight chapters, in which Hefner argues that 
Indonesian contemporary Muslims insist a greater political participation that 
we must see in a hybridic way, in which we should arrive at this input’s 
changing cultural contexts (historical background of culture, social pluralism, 
and state violence of the pre-reform age).9 To acquire this multiple insight, 
Hefner sees Muslims’ involvement in democracy from everything in a cross-
cultural entity, such as nationalism, religious conversion, capitalism, and 
democratic movement.10 
I observe Hefner’s multiple insights from his explanation about mass 
organizations, like the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) 
and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).  In regard to ICMI, Hefner complicates this 
organization’s particles ranging from its membership, its ideology, its role, to 
its idol, each of which is liable to diverge.  In terms of membership, Hefner 
differentiates it into two: Muslim intellectuals and political-change activists. 
However, each of these two groups continues to differing into other 
components due to their different ideologies: those who support President 
Soeharto, and those who oppose him. This divergence, nevertheless, is not 
exclusive because many of ICMI’s members combine their role as both 
scholars and activists. There are, nonetheless, few independent intellectuals of 
all ICMI’s members; yet, this minority has the greatest influence to both ICMI 
and Muslim public.  
Hefner refers to (late) Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur) to describe him as 
the idol of ICMI though Hefner provides with an account that says that Cak 
Nur is less influential to ICMI. As a matter of fact, Hefner comes with strong 
evidences saying that Cak Nur had been promoting Islamic vision of civil 
democracy since 1970 as he drafted ICMI’s targets and organization structure 
in 1990. In the meanwhile, public, in particular middle-class Muslims, 
considered Cak Nur to be a spiritual leader of ICMI. In fact, Cak Nur rejected 
politicization of Islam, while he advocated the influence of Islam to public life 
and politics.11   
Hefner, then, puts Cak Nur in opposition to Muslim conservatives (, like 
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia) who, in 1991 and 1992, used this 
organization to go against Christians and nationalists; in contrast, Cak Nur 
continued promoting religious tolerance.  In 1993 and 1994, Cak Nur kept 
advocating free speech and public criticism for democracy and society by 
                                                 
7Ibid., p. xiii 
8Ibid., p. xxi 
9Ibid., pp. vii, xvii. 
10Ibid., p. xvii 
11Ibid., p.143. 
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encouraging a “principled political opposition”, including multi party in 
addition to consultation and consensus. Moreover, Cak Nur did not stop his 
tolerance campaign in 1996 and 1997, when ethno religious violence occurred. 
In fact, he went public in opposition to Soeharto in his last month of 
presidency.12 
Hefner’s idea of the most influential few (Cak Nur) inspires me to 
wonder whether this category is unidirectional ethnocentrism since Hefner’s 
elucidation of Cak Nur reminds me of Clifford Gertz’s influential Western-
educated prijaji. Cak Nur is also a well-educated man who graduated from 
Chicago University in the US. However, I might consider well Hefner’ finding 
of popular-sovereignty-principle-based democracy that the majority of ICMI 
adhered. Hefner also breaks profoundly this most influential few into two 
other sub few:  Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Ismail Suny who were pro God-based 
power, an idea originated in Mohammad Natsir (leader of Masyumi) in the 
1950, and Amin Rais, including Ali Yafi , who assume presidency reservation 
for a Muslim. It is evidenced by the fact that Rais promoted distinction 
between Muslim and protected minority.13 
Like his explanation about ICMI, which is full of complex and shifting 
connections between this organization and the state, Hefner does the same 
approach to his clarification of NU. Hefner examines the critics who argue 
that NU’s complex and shifting relations to the government of the Old Order 
and the new one were a simply opportunist. Hefner opposes to this idea by 
saying that these relations of NU to the state was its “expression from within”: 
It was an NU’s political behaviour patterned before independence (1945).  
Hefner clarifies that NU had unusually dual leadership since it was 
founded in 1926: the executive body (Tanfidziyah) that included pragmatic 
politicians based in Jakarta, and the council of religious scholars (Syuriyah) 
that encompassed top Muslim learned men (`ulama’) across Indonesia. In 
1940, NU had an underground meeting with Soekarno to vote him as the future 
president of Indonesia, though his rival (Hatta) was more pious than him. As 
a result, NU maintained its ministry [of state] in 1945 [and in 1946]. In 1945, 
NU joined modernist Masyumi to support Pan Islamic political federation. In 
consequence, NU had been sustaining its employment monopoly in the 
ministry of religion since 1950s. In 1952, NU withdrew from this federation 
because most of its members were modernist (Masyumi), most of which were 
well-educated.14  
This circumstance led NU to shift its management from daily affairs by 
recruiting well-educated secular politicians; in the meanwhile, Syuriah 
                                                 
12Ibid., p. 144.  
13Ibid. 
14Ibid., p. 87. 
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granted this as long as they shielded the interest of Muslims and the role of 
NU. This sloppy behaviour penetrated evidently to the decentralized structure 
of NU’s traditional Qur’anic boarding schools (pesantren-s) headed by 
charismatic religious leaders (kiyai-s).15  
Hefner adds that NU continued shifting its compromises from 1957 to 
1960, when it was loyal to President Soekarno and his armed forces in 
countering the rebels of modernist Islam and sentiment of anti Java. 
Nevertheless, though NU was the most important player in Soekarno’s 
government of national unity (Nationalism, Religion, and 
Communism/NASAKOM) from 1959 to 1965, NU turned to be in favour of 
an Islamic state, and rejected Soekarno’s call for returning to Constitution 
1945 and for establishing Guided Democracy. In turn, NU was also willing to 
make special consideration to Soekarno’s government.16   
Hefner clarifies that these compromises of NU indicate that “complex 
balancing of multiple interests” guide NU’s “logic of concrete”. The abstract 
principles or ideological purity did not direct this organization. Hefner 
strengthens his argument by referring to Samson’s finding of NU’s 
“contextual logic”; it defended traditionalist Islam and maintains the interests 
of religion and individual as the result of NU’s less-“goal-centered” political 
party.17 Hefner elucidates that these interests refer to NU’s persuasive “mix 
nationalism, Javanese ethnic pride, and multi interest pragmatism” linked not 
to ideology, but to NU’s ‘ulama’ who took a lead of the core of this party.18   
Hefner, then, compare this contextual concrete of NU, which was far 
from its ideological decontamination to a larger society in the West, where 
Protestants and Catholics agreed to stop killing each other “not because of 
some sudden theological enlightenment.” It was because of decades of 
bloodshed in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth century that led the people to 
realize that “post-Reformation wars of religious purification were unwinnable 
and a greater evil than religious diversity”.19 Therefore, Hefner sees that NU’s 
flexible negotiations might have an enduring impact on politics in the future 
as this organization has to raise itself beyond its “immediate self-interest and 
mere political expedience.”20 
This multiple approach of Hefner makes me realize that historical 
sociology and social anthropology have led Hefner to focus on the contextual 
elements of his informants. My question would be: Can I dig the information 
of my future respondents not only from their contextual realms, but also from 
                                                 
15Ibid., p. 88. 
16Ibid., p. 86. 
17Ibid., p. 87. 
18Ibid. 
19Ibid., p. 88. 
20Ibid.  
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their textual ones by using linguistic anthropology? I ask this because, in daily 
life as I befriended with my NU’s colleagues in Indonesia, including my late 
grandpa who was devoted to NU’s rituals, they usually connect their problems 
to solve to the logic of Shafi’ite jurisprudence (fiqh). By so doing, I might 
transform my Islamic studies research from sacred texts to variety of practices. 
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